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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT,
INC. ,

:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

Case No. 20292

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
PATRICIA WADE fka PATRICIA
BURKE,

:

Defendant/Respondent.

:

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court erred in granting respondent's

motion to dismiss when a cause of action existed and there were
issues of fact and law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this proceeding, appellant, a Utah corporation, filed an
action against the respondent alleging fraudulent actions on the
part of the respondent in acquiring a piece of property in which
appellant claimed an interest.

The appellant filed an initial

complaint and an amended complaint and following a number of
hearings, the trial court with the Honorable Judith M. Billings
presiding, granted the respondent's motion for dismissal.

This

appeal is filed specifically to reverse that ruling.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant requests that this court reverse the decision
of the trial court and allow the matter to be tried on its
merits.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Advance Business Equipment, Inc., a Utah corporation, is an
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operating entity located in Salt Lake City, Utah, and is
primarily in the business of selling office machines in the
Intermountain area.

The president and principal stockholder of

Advance Business is Richard Burke.

In 1980, Richard Burke and

the defendant were engaged in divorce proceedings in a separate
action in the District Court of Salt Lake County, civil number
D-15225.

In that proceeding, it was Richard Burke's position

that a home in which the parties resided, located at
approximately 785 East 4596 South, in Salt Lake County, and
adjoining pasture land acreage was owned by the appellant herein
and was not marital property.

Judge Ernest Baldwin, however,

determined that the property was marital property and awarded the
home to the respondent and the adjoining acreage to Richard
Burke.
For various reasons that were set out in the initial
complaint and subsequent affidavits in this case, the divorce
decree was never reduced to writing and both parties intended to
appeal the court's judgment.

The respondent had advised

appellant that she would maintain a lis pendens on the property,
as claiming that the entire property should have been awarded to
her, and that she would do so until such time as the original
divorce order was resolved on appeal.

(See R.p.2-4 and p.40-43.)

Subsequent to that time, the pasture land property was
foreclosed by a third party, RoyType, who had a judgment against
the appellant.

The appellant did not take steps to prevent the

foreclosure because appellant was advised by the respondent that
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her lis pendens would be maintained and therefore, RoyType would
be unable to get title to the property.
31-32.)

(See R.p.37-38 and

The respondent, however, released the lis pendens

sometime later without advising the appellant and made a private
arrangement with the third party and secured the property in her
name.
Appellant brought this action in May of 1984 to reassert and
establish it's interest in said property based upon the
fraudulent acts of the respondent.

Following the filing of the

initial complaint, (see R.p.2-4) the respondent filed a motion
for summary judgment alleging inter alia that the fraud had not
been pled with particularity.

(R.p.24-29)

said motion on June 29, 1984.

(R.p.39)

A hearing was held on

At that time, the court

denied the motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint
without prejudice, and gave the appellant ten days to plead
fraud.

An amended complaint was filed within the required time

(R.p.40-42) in which fraud was pled with particularity.

The

respondent filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.

(R.p.47-48)

On September 7, 1984 following oral argument

to the court, the court granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss for
no cause of action and on the respondent's counterclaim, quieted
the title to the respondent.

(R.p.63)

That order was appealed

to this court on October 18, 1984.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in granting respondent's motion to
dismiss which was in effect a motion for summary judgment in that
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there were issues of fact and law and a cause of action sounding
in fraud.
ARGUMENT
This Court has long taken the position that any summary
proceeding which is dispositive of a lawsuit should be viewed
with great caution so that a party whose cause might have merit
is not deprived of the right to access to the court for the
enforcement of rights to redress of wrongs.

See McBride v.

Jones, 615 P.2d 432 (Utah 1980).
In this case, the appellant filed an action to assert it's
rights in a piece of real estate in Salt Lake County.
appellant's basic cause of action sounded in fraud.

The
Essentially,

the appellant's position was that it had relied on certain
representations made by the defendant which caused it to forebear
in taking any action to prevent the foreclosure of the property
by a third party, RoyType.

If the appellant is correct in it's

allegations and the respondent did exactly what was stated in the
amended complaint and the affidavit of both Richard Burke and
counsel for the appellant, then the actions were clearly
fraudulent; she made material misrepresentations which caused
others to rely on them to their detriment when she knew that the
representations were in fact untrue and in fact she was intending
all along to secure an interest for herself in the property which
she had not been able to do in the original divorce proceeding.
The difficulty for Judge Billings seemed to be the argument
that was presented in defendant's second motion to dismiss which
was, in effect, "even if the allegations are correct, it would
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not affect the plaintiff's title to the property because of the
intervention of the third party."

The problem with this argument

is that it fails to recognize two important aspects of this case:
1.

That the initial decision concerning this property by a

District Court Judge in a divorce proceeding was itself being
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and therefore, had not been
finalized.

2.

The judgment divesting the appellant of it's

interest in this property by the third party did not divest the
interest of the appellant that it may obtain through the
respondent if the original divorce decree is modified on appeal
concerning whether or not the entire property belonged to the
corporation.
The order in the case of RoyType v. Advance Business
Equipment, et al, Civil Mo. C82-8963, is specific in that it
removes any claims of the appellant to RoyTypefs right, title and
interest to the property but does not remove any interest the
appellant may have as it pertains to Patricia Burke's interest in
said property.

(See R.20-22)

This becomes important if one

views the situation in two alternative ways:
1.

If the appellant is successful in the divorce appeal in

persuading this court to reverse Judge Baldwin's decision and
determine that all of the property, including the home, belong to
the corporation and was not marital property, then the interest
that Patricia Burke claimed in the home would revert to the
appellant and appellant would then be in a position to negotiate
for the pasture land property utilizing it's interest in the
home.
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2.

Notwithstanding the appeal, if Patricia Burke had

maintained her lis pendens as she indicated that she would do
based upon the fact that she believed that all of the property
should have been awarded to her, RoyType would never have been
able to gain clear title to the property.

The appellant was

prepared at the time to negotiate with the respondent to make
some disposition of the property so that both parties could
clearly obtain their interest in the property free of the RoyType
obligation.
Admittedly, these are speculative matters, however, it is
clear that had the appellant known that the respondent had no
intention of maintaining her lis pendens when RoyType moved for
foreclosure, it could have taken steps like filing bankruptcy or
some other action to stop the proceedings.

The appellant's

reliance on respondent to maintain the lis pendens in effect
caused the appellant to forebear from taking any steps to protect
it's interest.

As a practical matter, RoyType did have a

judgment against the appellant and foreclosed against that
judgment, and appellant basically had no way at the time to clear
the judgment within the normal six month period.

It could have,

however, filed a bankruptcy or taken some other action to stay
the proceedings if the appellant had known that the respondent's
lis pendens was not filed.

Thus, the argument that it makes no

difference simply is not sustainable if one reviews the entire
transaction between these parties.
Appellant concedes that it has an up hill battle at best and
that it's case is contingent upon being able to prove the
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misrepresentations and the fraudulent acts complained of by the
respondent.

The appellant, however, should be allowed to do this

in a trial on the merits.
This Court has recently said in the case of Gadd v. Olson,
685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984), that a motion for summary judgment (or
for that matter any summary proceeding, a motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action) can only be
granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
and even assuming the facts as asserted by the party moved
against to be true, that the party could not prevail.

This is a

restatement of this Courtfs position in many cases concerning
summary proceedings.

See also Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224

(Utah 1983).
Upon a summary motion being presented, the court can examine
not only the pleadings themselves but other documents that were
filed in this case which consisted of affidavits by both the
president of the appellant company and the attorney for the
appellant company.

These affidavits, if true, support the

appellant's theory that fraudulent acts by the respondent were
committed.

It is interesting to note that in all of the

submissions in this case, the respondent never submitted an
affidavit specifically denying the allegations contained in the
two complaints that were filed or specifically denying that
certain misrepresentations were not made.

She consistently

submitted affidavits only alleging that she considered the
president of the appellant company to be a trespassor on the
property.

Therefore, at the motion hearings, the court had
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nothing but the basic pleadings, the affidavits and, of course,
the memorandums submitted by counsel which are part of the record
in this Court.

A reading of those affidavits alone establish

that there are factual disputes that need to be resolved and
establish a cause of action sounding in fraud.
What is interesting is that in the lower court1s initial
decision, with respect to the motion to summary judgment, the
court denied the motion for summary judgment but specifically
directed the appellant to amend it's complaint to allege fraud
with particularity.

The appellant did so.

Then, respondent

filed a motion to dismiss based upon no Cciuse of action conceding
to some extent that the fraud had been pled with particularity
but in effect saying that even if it is proven, it is of no
consequence.

The court took no testimony on this case nor

considered any of the potential evidence other than that referred
to in the memorandum of the parties.

It would seem somewhat

inconsistent for the lower court on the one hand to say that
summary judgment would not granted as long as fraud was pled with
particularity and then dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action when, in fact, the fraud has now been pled with
particularity and supported by affidavits.

This proceeding

deserves to have a full hearing on the merits and appellant
believes that a thorough review of the record and the memorandum
submitted by counsel as part of that record should convince this
Court to reverse the lower court's decision and allow a full
hearing.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in granting respondent's motion to
dismiss based upon failure to state a cause of action in that a
cause of action was stated, there were genuine issues of fact
that required a full hearing and the proceeding should not have
been disposed of in a summary fashion.

This court is urged to

reverse the lower court's decision and allow appellant it's day
in court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

|H

d

^Y of March, 1985.

JOm T. CAINE
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
DEFENDANT f s COUNTERCLAIM

vs.
Civil No. C84-3072
Judge Judith M. Billings

PATRICIA M. BURKE,
Defendant.

Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and
56(b), defendant Patricia M. Burke moves the Court to dismiss
plaintiff's Complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted and for Summary Judgment
in her favor upon defendant's Counterclaim because there are
no material issues of fact; the grounds for this Motion are
more fully set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief
Can be Granted and Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant's
Counterclaim of even date.
DATED this

day of August, 1984.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

larvhr A. (uajrsen
A t t o r n e y s for P a t r i c i a M. Burke
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9 000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT,
a Utah corporation,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C84-3072
Judge Judith M. Billings

PATRICIA M. BURKE,
Defendant.

On September 7, 1984, defendant's Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted and
Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaim came
on for hearing before the above-captioned Court, the Honorable
Judith M. Billings presiding.

Plaintiff was represented by

John T. Caine; defendant was represented by Mark A. Larsen.
After considering the pleadings, motion, memorandum filed in
support thereof, and the arguments of counsel, it is hereby
ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a

Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted is granted; plaintiff's

Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice;
2.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant's

Counterclaim is granted;
3.

Defendant Patricia M. Burke owns the real property

described in paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint and is entitled
to quiet and peaceful possession thereof;
4.

Plaintiff Advance Business Equipment has no claim or

interest whatsoever in or to the real property described in
paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint;
5.

Plaintiff Advance Business Equipment, its employees,

successors and assigns, are permanently enjoined from asserting
any claim to the subject real property described in paragraph 2
of the Amended Complaint adverse to defendant Patricia M.
Burke's title;
6.

Plaintiff Advance Business Equipment is ordered to

release the Lis Pendens which it filed in the above-captioned
case within ten days from the date of this Order;
7.

Plaintiff Advance Business Equipment, its agents and

employees, successors and assigns, including Richard C. Burke,
are permanently enjoined from trespassing upon defendant Patricia
M. Burke's real property described in paragraph 2 of the Amended
Complaint; those agents and employees shall immediately remove
all personal property from defendant's real property;
8.

Defendant's Motion for attorneys' fees and costs

incurred in the above-captioned matter is denied;
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9.

This Order is not intended to interfer with any

action taken by the Court in the divorce action, Civil No.
D-15225.
DATED this <?L(c ~ day of September, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

7?i
JVVpm M. BILLINGS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
.v
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